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1. Introduction   
 
Issues about explanation in psychology and neurobiology have received a great 
deal of philosophical attention lately. To a significant degree this reflects the impact of 
discussions of mechanism and mechanistic explanation in recent philosophy of science. 
Several writers (hereafter mechanists), including perhaps most prominently, Carl Craver 
and David Kaplan (Craver 2000, 2006; Kaplan and Craver 2011, Kaplan 2011), have 
argued that at least in psychology and neuroscience, mechanistic theories or models are 
the predominant mode of explanation, with other sorts of theories or models often being 
merely “descriptive” or “phenomenological” rather than explanatory2. Other writers such 
as Chermero and Silberstein (2008) have disputed this, arguing that, e.g., dynamical 
systems models are not mechanistic but nonetheless explanatory. This literature raises a 
number of issues, which I propose to examine below. First, how should we understand 
the contrast between explanatory and descriptive or phenomenological models within the 
context of neuroscience? What qualifies a theory or model as “mechanistic” and are there 
reasons, connected to some (plausible) general account of explanation, for supposing that 
only mechanistic theories explain? Or do plausible general theories of explanation 
suggest that other theories besides mechanistic ones explain? In particular, what does a 
broadly interventionist account of causation and explanation suggest about this question? 
If there are plausible candidates for non-mechanistic forms of explanation in psychology 
or neurobiology, what might these look like? What should we think about the explanatory 
status of “higher level” psychological or neurobiological theories that abstract away from 
“lower level” physiological, neurobiological or molecular detail and are, at least in this 
respect, “non-mechanistic?” 
In what follows I will argue for the following conclusions. First, I will suggest 
that an interventionist framework like that developed in Woodward (2003) can be used to 
distinguish theories and models that are explanatory from those that are merely 
descriptive. This framework can also be used to characterize a notion of a mechanistic 
explanation, according to which mechanistic explanations are those that meet 
interventionist criteria for successful explanation and certain additional constraints as 
well. However, from an interventionist perspective, although mechanistic theories have a 
number of virtues, it is a mistake to think that mechanistic models are the exclusive or 
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 Thanks to Mazviita Chirimuuta and David Kaplan for helpful comments on an earlier 
draft.  
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 David Kaplan has informed me that the intention in Kaplan and Craver, 2011 was not to 
exclude the possibility that there might be forms of non-mechanistic explanation that 
were different from the dynamical and other models the authors targeted as non-
explanatory. At Kaplan’s suggestion, I have adopted the formulation in this sentence 
(mechanism as “the predominant mode of explanation”) to capture this point.  
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uniquely  dominant mode of explanation in neuroscience and psychology. In particular, 
the idea that models that provide more mechanistically relevant  low-level  detail
3
  are, 
even ceteris paribus, explanatorily superior to those which do not is misguided. Instead, 
my contrasting view, which I take to be supported by the interventionist account as well 
as modeling practice in neuroscience, is that many explanatory models in neurobiology 
will necessarily abstract away from such detail At the same time, however, I think that 
                                                 
3
 As Kaplan has observed in correspondence  almost everyone agrees that the addition of 
true but irrelevant detail does not improve the quality of explanations; the real issue is 
what counts as “relevant detail” for  improving the quality of an explanation.  Kaplan  
(2011) thinks of relevant detail as a “mechanistically relevant detail” (my emphasis): 
  
3M [Kaplan’s and Craver’s requirements on mechanistic explanation—see below] 
aligns with the highly plausible assumption that the more accurate and detailed 
the model is for a target system or phenomenon the better it explains that 
phenomenon, all other things being equal (for a contrasting view, see Batterman 
2009). As one incorporates more mechanistically relevant details into the model, 
for example, by including additional variables to represent additional mechanism 
components, by changing the relationships between variables to better reflect the 
causal dependencies among components, or by further adjusting the model 
parameters to fit more closely what is going on in the target mechanism, one 
correspondingly improves the quality of the explanation.  
 
 One possible understanding of “relevant detail” is detail about significant difference-
makers for the explananda we are trying to explain—a detail is “relevant” if variations in 
that detail (within some suitable range) would “make a difference” for the explananda of 
interest (although possibly not for other explananda having to do with the behavior of the 
system at some other level of analysis). This is essentially the picture of explanation I 
advocate below.  I take it, however, that this is probably not what Kaplan (and Craver) 
have in mind when the speak of mechanistically relevant detail, since they hold, for 
example, that the addition of information about the molecular details of the opening and 
closing of individual  ion channels would improve the explanatory quality of the original 
Hodgkin-Huxley model even though (assuming my argument below is correct) this 
information does not describe difference-makers for the explanandum represented by the 
generation of the action potential.  (This molecular information is difference-making 
information for other explananda.) Similarly, Kaplan differentiates his views from 
Batterman in the passage quoted above, presumably on the grounds that the information 
that Batterman thinks plays an explanatory role in, e.g., explanations of critical point 
behavior in terms of the renormalization group (see below), is not mechanistically 
relevant detail. So while it would be incorrect to describe Kaplan and Craver as holding 
that the addition of just any detail improves the quality of explanations,  it seems to me 
that they do have a conception of the sort  of detail that improves explanatory quality that 
contrasts with other possible positions, including my own (and Batterman’s). I’ve tried to 
do justice to this difference by using the phrase “mechanistically relevant detail” to 
describe their position.  
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the mechanists are right, against some of their dynamicist critics, in holding that 
explanation is different from prediction (and from subsumption under a “covering law”) 
and that some of the dynamical systems-based models touted in the recent literature are 
merely descriptive rather than explanatory. This is not, however, because all such 
dynamical systems models or all models that abstract away from implementation detail 
are unexplanatory, but rather because more specific features of some models of this sort 
render them explanatorily unsatisfactory.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some 
ideas from the neuroscience on the difference between explanatory and descriptive 
models. Sections 3 and 4 relate these ideas to the interventionist account of causation and 
explanation I defend elsewhere (Woodward, 2003). Section 5 discusses the idea that 
different causal or explanatory factors, often operating at different scales, will be 
appropriate for different models, depending on what we are trying to explain. Section 6 
illustrates this with some neurobiological examples. Section 7 asks what makes an 
explanation distinctively “mechanistic” and argues that, in the light of previous sections, 
we should not expect all explanation in neuroscience to be mechanistic. Section 8 argues 
that, contrary to what some mechanists have claimed, abandoning the requirement that all 
explanation be mechanistic does not lead to instrumentalism or other similar sins. Section 
9 illustrates the ideas in previous sections by reference to the Hodgkin-Huxley model of 
the generation of the action potential. Section 10 concludes the discussion.  
 
2. Explanatory versus Descriptive Models in Neuroscience 
 
 Since the contrast between models or theories that explain and those that do not 
will be central to what follows, it is useful to begin with some remarks from some 
neuroscientists about how they understand this contrast. Here is a representative 
quotation from a recent textbook: 
 
The questions what, how, and why are addressed by descriptive, mechanistic, and 
interpretive models, each of which we discuss in the following chapters. 
Descriptive models summarize large amounts of experimental data compactly yet 
accurately, thereby characterizing what neurons and neural circuits do. These 
models may be based loosely on biophysical, anatomical, and physiological 
findings, but their primary purpose is to describe phenomena, not to explain them. 
Mechanistic models, on the other hand, address the question of how nervous 
systems operate on the basis of known anatomy, physiology, and circuitry. Such 
models often form a bridge between descriptive models couched at different 
levels. Interpretive models use computational and information-theoretic principles 
to explore the behavioral and cognitive significance of various aspects of nervous 
system function, addressing the question of why nervous systems operate as they 
do. (Dayan and Abbott, 2001)  
 
In this passage, portions of which are also cited by Kaplan and Craver (2011), Dayan and 
Abbott draw a contrast between descriptive and mechanistic models, and suggest that the 
former are not (and by contrast, that the latter presumably are) explanatory. However, 
they also introduce, in portions of the above comments not quoted by Craver and Kaplan, 
 4 
a third category of model—interpretative models—which are also described as explaining 
(and as answering why questions, as opposed to the how questions answered by 
mechanistic models). The apparent implication is that although mechanistic models 
explain, other sorts of models that are not mechanistic do so as well, and both have a role 
to play in understanding the brain.  
Dayan and Abbott go on to say, in remarks to which I will return to below, that: 
 
It is often difficult to identify the appropriate level of modeling for a particular 
problem. A frequent mistake is to assume that a more detailed model is 
necessarily superior. Because models act as bridges between levels of 
understanding, they must be detailed enough to make contact with the lower level 
yet simple enough to provide clear results at the higher level. 
 
 These remarks introduce a number of ideas that I discuss below: (1) Neuroscientists 
recognize a distinction between explanatory and merely descriptive theories and models
4
; 
(2) For purposes of explanation, more detail is not always better; (3) Different models 
may be appropriate at different “levels”5 of understanding or analysis, with it often being 
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 One possible response to the use of words like “explanation”, “understanding” and so 
on in these passages as well as those from Trappenberg immediately below, is that we 
should understand these words as mere honorifics, with the labeling of a theory as 
“explanatory” meaning nothing more than “I like it or regard it as impressive”, rather 
than anything of any deeper methodological significance. It is not easy, however, to 
reconcile this suggestion with the care these authors take in contrasting explanatory 
models with those that are merely descriptive or phenomenological. Another more radical 
response would be to acknowledge that these authors to mean what they say but claim 
that they are simply mistaken about what constitutes an explanation in neuroscience with 
the correct view being the position advocated by mechanists. I assume, however, that few 
philosophers would favor such a dismissive response, especially since, as noted below, 
there are normative accounts of explanation (such as interventionism) which support the 
quoted ideas. Let me also add that although it is true that one motive for abstraction away 
from detail is to enhance computational tractability, the passages quoted and many of the 
examples discussed below make it clear that this is not the only motive: sometimes such 
abstraction leads to better explanations, where this is not just a matter of improved 
computational tractability. 
5
 Talk of “levels” of explanation is ubiquitous in neuroscience, psychology, and 
philosophy, although many commentators (myself included—see Woodward, 2008) also 
complain about the unclarity of this notion. In order to avoid getting enmeshed in the 
philosophical literature on this subject, let me just say that the understanding of this 
notion I will adopt (which I think also fits with the apparent views of the neuroscientists 
discussed below) is a very deflationary one, according to which level talk is just a way of 
expressing claims about explanatory or causal relevance and irrelevance: To say that a 
multiple compartment model of the neuron (see section 6) is the right level for modeling   
dendritic currents (or an appropriate model at the level of such currents)  is just to say 
that such a model captures the factors relevant to the explanation of dendritic currents. 
This gives us only a very local and contextual notion of level and also makes it entirely 
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far from obvious which level of modeling is most appropriate for a given set of 
phenomena; and (4) It is nonetheless important to be able to relate or connect models at 
different levels.  
  A second set of remarks come from a discussion of computational neuroscience 
modeling in Trappenberg (2002).  
 
As scientists, we want to find the roots of natural phenomena. The explanations 
we are seeking are usually deeper than merely parameterizing experimental data 
with specific functions. Most of the models in this book are intended to capture 
processes that are thought of as being the basis of the information-processing 
capabilities of the brain. This includes models of single neurons, networks of 
neurons, and specific architectures capturing brain organizations. …. 
 
The current state of neuroscience, often still exploratory in nature, frequently 
makes it difficult to find the right level of abstraction to properly investigate 
hypotheses. Some models in computational neuroscience have certainly been too 
abstract to justify claims derived from them. On the other hand, there is a great 
danger in keeping too many details that are not essential for the scientific 
argument. Models are intended to simplify experimental data, and thereby to 
identify which details of the biology are essential to explain particular aspects of a 
system. 
 
…. What we are looking for, at least in this book, is a better comprehension of 
brain mechanisms on explanatory levels. It is therefore important to learn about 
the art of abstraction, making suitable simplifications to a system without 
abolishing the important features we want to comprehend. 
 
Here, as in the passage quoted from Dayan and Abbott, the notion of a finding an 
explanatory model is connected to finding the right “level” of “abstraction”, with the 
suggestion that this has to do with discovering which features of a system are “essential” 
or necessary for the explanation of those phenomena. Elsewhere Trappenberg connects 
this to the notion of a “minimal” model— “minimal” in the sense that the model includes 
just those features or details which are necessary or required to account for whatever it is 
that we are trying to understand and nothing more
6
. Trappenberg writes that “we want the 
model to be as simple as possible while still capturing the main aspects of the data that 
the model should capture” and that “ it can be advantageous to highlight the minimal 
features necessary to enable certain emergent properties in [neural] network [models]”. 
 
3. An Interventionist Account of Causation and Explanation 
                                                                                                                                                 
an empirical, aposteriori issue what level of theorizing is appropriate for understanding a 
given set of phenomena; it does not carry any suggestion that reality as a whole can be 
divided into “layers” of levels on the basis of size or compositional relations or that 
“upper level” causes (understood compositionally) cannot affect lower level causes.  
6
 For recent discussions of the notion (or perhaps notions) of a minimal model see 
Chirimuuta, 2014 and Batterman and Rice, 2014.  
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 How, if at all, might the ideas in these remarks be related to an interventionist 
account of causal explanation? I begin with a brief sketch of that account and then 
attempt to connect it to some issues about modeling and explanation in neuroscience 
suggested by the remarks quoted above. According to the interventional model, causal 
and causally explanatory claims are understood as claims about what would happen to the 
value of some variable under hypothetical manipulations (interventions
7
) on other 
variables. A causal claim of form X causes Y is true if (i) if some interventions that 
change the value of X are “possible” and (ii) under those interventions the value of Y 
would change. A more specific causal claim (e.g., that X and Y are causally related 
according to Y=F(X) where F is some specified function) will be true if, under 
interventions on X, Y responds in the way described by F. For our purposes, we may 
think of the following as a necessary condition for a structure H to count as a causal 
explanation of some explanandum E:  
 
H consists of true causal generalizations {Gi} (true according to the criteria just 
specified) and additional true claims C (often but not always about the values 
taken by initial and boundary conditions) in the systems for which H holds such 
that C U { Gi } entails E and alternatives to E would hold according to Gi if 
alternatives to C were to be realized (e.g. if those initial and boundary conditions 
were to take different values).  
 
For example (cf. Woodward, 2003), an explanation of why the electromagnetic field due 
to presence of a uniform current along a long straight wire is given by the expression  
 
(3.1) E = 1/2πeoL/r 
 
(where E is the field intensity, L the charge density along the wire, and r the distance 
from the wire) might consist of a derivation of expression (3.1) from Coulomb’s law, and 
facts about the geometry of the wire and the charge distribution along it, as well as 
information about how the expression describing the field would have been different if 
the geometry of the conductor or the charge distribution had been different, where (in this 
case) this will involve additional derivations also appealing to Coulomb’s law. In this 
way the explanation answers a set of what Woodward, 2003 calls what-if-things-had-
been-different-questions, identifying conditions under which alternatives to the 
explanandum would have occurred. This requirement that an explanation answer such 
questions is meant to capture the intuitive idea that a successful explanation should 
identify conditions that are explanatorily or causally relevant to the explanandum: the 
relevant factors are just those that “make a difference” to the explanandum in the sense 
that changes in these factors lead to changes in the explanandum. This requirement fits 
naturally with the notion of a minimal model on at least one construal of this notion: such 
a model will incorporate all and only those factors which are relevant to an explanandum 
in the sense described. The requirement also embodies the characteristic interventionist 
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 An intervention is an idealized, non-confounded experimental manipulation. See 
Woodward (2003). 
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idea that causally explanatory information is information that is in principle exploitable 
for manipulation and control. It is when this what-if things-had been different condition is 
satisfied that changing or manipulating the conditions cited in the explanans will change 
the explanandum. Finally, we may also think of this “what-if–things-had-been-different” 
condition as an attempt to capture the idea that successful explanations exhibit 
dependency relationships: exhibiting dependency relations is a matter of exhibiting how 
the explanandum would have been different under changes in the factors cited in the 
explanans.  
 Next a brief aside about non-casual forms of why explanations—another topic 
which I lack the space to discuss in the detail that it deserves. I agree that there are forms 
of why-explanation that are not naturally regarded as causal. One way of understanding 
these (and distinguishing them from causal explanations), defended in passing in 
Woodward, 2003,  is to take  causal explanations to involve dependency or difference-
making relationships (that answer what-if-things-had-been- different questions) that have 
to do with what would happen under interventions. Non-causal forms of why-explanation 
also answer what-if- things-had-been-different questions but by citing dependency 
relations  or information about difference-makers that does not have an interventionist 
interpretation. For example, the universal behavior of many systems near their critical 
point depends on certain features of their Hamiltonian but arguably this is not naturally 
regarded as a form of causal dependence—cf. footnote 10. The trajectory of an object 
moving along an inertial path depends on the affine structure of spacetime but again this 
is not plausibly viewed as a case of casual dependence. In what follows I will sometimes 
speak generically of dependency relations, where this is meant to cover both the 
possibility that these are causal and the possibility that they are non-causal.  
Many different devices are employed in science to describe dependency relations 
between explanans and explanandum, including directed graphs of various sorts (with an 
arrow from X to Y meaning that Y depends in some way on X) Such graphs are widely 
used in the biological sciences). However, one of the most common (and precise) such 
devices involves the use of equations. These can provide interventionist information (or 
more generally information about dependency relations) by spelling out explicitly how 
changes in the values of one or more variables depend on changes (including changes due 
to interventions) in the values of others. In contrast to the tendency of some mechanists 
(e.g. Bogen, 2005) to downplay the significance of mathematical relationships in 
explanation, the interventionist framework instead sees mathematical relationships as 
playing a central role in many explanations, including many neuroscientifc explanations
8
. 
Often they are the best means we have of representing the dependency relations that are 
crucial to successful explanation.  
In its emphasis on the role played by generalizations, including those taking a 
mathematical form, in explanation and causal analysis, the interventionist account has 
some affinities with the DN model. However, in other respects, it is fundamentally 
different. In particular, the interventionist account rejects the DN idea that subsumption 
under a “covering law” is sufficient for successful explanation; a derivation can provide 
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 This is certainly not true of all mechanists. Kaplan (2011) is a significant exception and 
Bechtel (e.g. Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 2013) has also emphasized the important role of 
mathematics in explanation in neuroscience and psychology.  
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such subsumption and yet fail to satisfy interventionist requirements on explanation, as a 
number of the examples discussed below illustrate. In addition, although the 
interventionist account requires information about dependency relations, generalizations 
and other sorts of descriptions that fall short of being laws can provide such information, 
so the interventionist account does not require laws for explanation. I stress this point 
because I want to separate the issue of whether the DN model is an adequate account of 
explanation (here I agree with mechanists in rejecting this model) from the issue of 
whether good explanations, including many in neuroscience, often take a mathematical or 
derivational form – a claim which I endorse. Interventionism provides a framework that 
allows for recognition of the role of mathematical structure in explanation without 
adopting the specific commitments of the DN model.  
With these basic interventionist ideas in hand, now let me make explicit some 
additional features that will be relevant to the discussion below. First, in science we are 
usually interested in explaining regularities or recurrent patterns – what Bogen and 
Woodward (1988) call phenomena – rather than individual events. For example, we are 
usually interested in explaining why the field created by all long straight conductors with 
a uniform charge distribution is given by (3.1) rather than explaining why some particular 
conductor creates such a field. Or at least we interested in explaining the latter only 
insofar as the explanation we provide will also count as an explanation of the former. In 
other words, contrary to what some philosophical discussions of explanation suggest, it is 
wrong to think of explanation in science in terms of a “two stage” model in which one (i) 
first explains why some singular explanandum E (e.g. that a particular wire produces a 
certain field) by appealing to some low-level covering generalization G (e.g. 3.1) saying 
that E occurs regularly and then, in a second, independent step, (ii) explains why G itself 
holds via an appeal to some deeper generalization (e.g., Coulomb’s law). Usually in 
scientific practice there is no separate step conforming to (i)
9
. Or, to put the point slightly 
differently, the low level generalization (G) is treated as something to be explained – a 
claim about a phenomenon – rather than as potential explainer of anything, despite the 
fact that many such Gs (including (3.1)) qualify as “law-like”, on at least some 
conceptions of scientific law.  
 Because claims about phenomena describe repeatable patterns they necessarily 
abstract away from some of the idiosyncrasies of particular events that fall under those 
patterns, providing instead more generic descriptions, often characterized as “stylized” or 
“prototypical”. For example, the Hodgkin- Huxley model, described below, takes as its 
explanandum the shape of the action potential of an individual neuron, but this 
explanandum amounts to a generic representation of important features of the action 
potential rather than a description of any individual action potential in all of its 
idiosyncrasy. This in turn has implications for what an explanatory model of this 
explanandum should look like – what such a model aims to do is to describe the factors 
on which the generic features of this repeatable pattern depend, rather than to reproduce 
all of the feature of individual instances of the pattern. Put differently, since individual 
neurons will differ in many details, what we want is an account of how all neurons 
meeting certain general conditions are able to generate action potentials despite this 
variation. 
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  See Woodward, 1979 for additional argument in support of this claim.  
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 This framework may also be used to capture one  natural notion of a (merely) 
“phenomenological” model (but not the only one; see section 8 below): one may think of 
this as a model or representation that consists just of a generalization playing the role of 
G above – in other words, a model that merely describes some “phenomenon” understood 
as a recurrent pattern. Trappenberg (2002) provides an illustration
10
: the tuning curves of 
neurons in the LGN (lateral geniculate nucleus) may be described by means of class of 
functions called Gabor functions, which can be fitted to the experimental data with 
parameters estimated directly from that data. Trappenberg describes the resulting curves 
as a “phenomenological model” of the response fields in the LGN, adding that “ of course 
this phenomenological model does not tell us anything about the biophysical mechanisms 
underlying the formation of receptive fields and why the cells respond in this particular 
way” (p. 6). The tuning curves describe phenomena in the sense of Bogen and 
Woodward; they are generalizations which describe potential explananda but which are 
not themselves regarded as furnishing explanations. An “explanation” in this context 
would explain why these neurons have the response properties described by the tuning 
curves—that is, what these response properties depend on. Obviously, merely citing the 
fitted functions does not do this. As this example illustrates, this contrast between a 
merely phenomenological model and an explanatory one falls naturally out of the 
interventionist framework, as does the contrast between DN and interventionist 
conceptions of explanation. The fitted functions describe and predict neuronal responses 
(they show the neuronal responses to particular stimuli “were to be expected” and do so 
via subsumption under a “covering” generalization, which many philosophers are willing 
to regard as locally “lawlike” ), but they do not explain those responses on the 
interventionist account of explanation.  
 This idea that explanations are directed at explaining phenomena naturally 
suggests a second point. This is that what sorts of factors and generalizations it is 
appropriate to cite in an explanans (and in particular, the level of detail that is 
appropriate) depends on the explananda E we want to account for, where (remember) this 
will be characterization at a certain level of detail or abstractness. In providing an 
explanation we are looking for just those factors which make a difference to whatever 
explananda are our target, and thus it will be at least permissible (and perhaps desirable) 
not to include in our explanans those factors S* which are such that variations or changes 
in those factors make no difference for whether E holds. (Of course, as illustrated below, 
an explanans that includes S* may well furnish an explanation of some other 
explanandum E* which is related to E—for example by describing the more detailed 
behavior of some particular set of instances of E.)
11
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 Kaplan (2011) also uses this illustration.  
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 There is a very large philosophical literature on abstraction, idealization, and the use of 
“fictions” in modeling which I will largely ignore for reasons of space. However, a few 
additional orienting remarks may be useful. First, a number of writers (e.g. Thomson-
Jones, 2005)   distinguish  between idealization, understood as the introduction of false or 
fictional claims into a model, and abstraction, which involves omitting detail, but without 
introducing falsehoods or misrepresentation. I myself do not believe that thinking about 
the sorts of examples philosophers have in mind when they talk about “idealization” in 
terms of categories like “false” and “fictional” is very illuminating , but in any case it is 
 10 
 A physics example illustrates this point with particular vividness. Consider the 
“universal” behavior exhibited by a wide variety of different materials including fluids of 
different material composition and magnets near their critical points, with both being 
characterized by the same critical exponent b. In the case of fluids, for example, behavior 
near the critical point can be characterized in terms of an “order” parameter S given by 
the difference in densities between the liquid and vapor forms of the fluid S = óliq - óvap. 
As the temperature T of the system approaches the critical temperature Tc, S is found to 
depend upon a power of the “reduced” temperature t= T-Tc/T 
 
S~ |t|
b
 
 
 Where b is the critical exponent referred to above. Remarkably, the same value of 
b characterizes not just different fluids but also the behavior of magnets in the transition 
from ferromagnetic to paramagnetic phases.  
Suppose one is interested in explaining why some particular kind of fluid has the 
critical point that it does. Since different kinds of fluids have different critical points, the 
value of Tc for any particular fluid will indeed depend on microphysical details about its 
material composition. However, if one is instead interested in explaining the universal 
behavior just described (the phenomenon or generic fact that S ~ |t|
b
 with fixed b for 
many different materials), then (as particularly emphasized by Batterman in a series of 
papers—e.g. 2009) information about the differing microphysical details of different 
fluids is irrelevant: within the interventionist framework it is non-difference-making 
information. That is, this universal behavior does not depend on these microphysical 
details since, as we have just noted, variations in those details do not make a difference 
for whether this universal behavior occurs. In other words, the universality of this 
                                                                                                                                                 
worth emphasizing that the goal of including in one’s model only those features that 
make a difference to some explanandum need not, in itself, involve the introduction of 
falsehood or misrepresentation; instead it involves the omission of non –difference-
making detail.  However, I will also add that I do not think that most of the cases of 
modeling of upper level systems discussed below are usefully viewed as involving only 
the omission of detail present in some lower level model—i.e. such upper level models 
do not just involve abstraction from a lower level model. Instead, such modeling typically 
introduces new detail/explanatory features not found in models of lower level systems—
that is, it adds as well as removes. Of course if, like Strevens (2008), one begins with the 
idea that one has available a fundamental level theory T that somehow represents or 
contains “all” explanatorily relevant factors at all levels of analysis for a system (a neural 
“theory of everything”) , then models of higher level behavior will involve only dropping 
various sorts of detail from T. But actual examples of lower level models in science are 
not like T—instead they include detail which is difference-making for some much more 
restricted set of explananda, with the consequence that when we wish to explain other 
higher level explananda, we must include additional difference-making factors. To take 
an example discussed in more detail below, one doesn’t get the Hodgkin-Huxley model 
for the action potential just by omitting detail from a lower level multi-compartment 
model; instead the H-H model introduces a great deal of relevant information that is 
“new” with respect to any actual lower level model.  
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behavior shows us that its explanation must be found elsewhere than in details about the 
differences in material composition of different fluids. In fact, as Batterman argues, the 
explanation for universal behavior is provided by renormalization group techniques 
which in effect trace the behavior to very generic qualitative features (e.g., certain 
symmetries) that are shared by the Hamiltonians governing the interactions occurring in 
each of the systems, despite the fact these Hamiltonians differ in detail for each system
12
. 
This example provides a concrete illustration of the point made more abstractly by 
Abbot and Dayan and by Trappenberg: it is not always correct that adding additional 
accurate detail (for example, details about the different Hamiltonians governing the 
different systems above) improves the quality of one’s explanation. Instead, this can 
detract from the goodness of the explanation if the target explanandum does not depend 
on the details in question. Or at the very least, it is not mandatory in constructing an 
explanation that one provide such detail.   Arguably a similar point follows if the detail in 
question is “mechanistically relevant  detail”—the explanatory import of the 
renormalization groups account of critical point behavior would not be improved by the 
provision of such detail.  
 
4. “Levels” of explanation and independence 
  
 The general idea of an explanandum “not depending” on “lower level” or 
implementational/compositional/realizational detail deserves more development that I 
can give it here, but a few additional comments may be helpful in fleshing out the picture 
I have in mind. First, when we speak of non-dependence on such detail, what we have in 
mind is non-dependence within a certain range of variation of such detail, rather than 
complete independence from all facts about realization. For example, in the example 
discussed above, the value of the critical exponent b does not depend on variations in the 
composition of the fluid being investigated—whether it is water, liquid helium etc. This 
is not to say, however, that “lower-level facts” about such fluids play no role in 
determining the value of b. But the facts that are relevant are very generic features of the 
Hamiltonians characterizing these particular fluids – features that are common to a large 
range of fluids – rather than features that distinguish one fluid from another. To the extent 
there are materials that do not meet these generic conditions, the model will not apply to 
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 I gloss over a number of important issues here. But to avoid a possible 
misunderstanding let me say that the similarity between explanation of critical point 
behavior in terms of the renormalization group and the neurobiological explanations I 
consider is that in both cases certain behaviors are independent of variations in lower 
level details. However there is also an important difference: in the neurobiological cases, 
it often seems reasonable to regard the explanations as causal, in the case of the 
explanation of critical point behavior the explanation is (in my view and also in 
Batterman’s) not causal.  As suggested above, I would be inclined to trace this difference 
to the fact that in the neurobiological examples the explanatorily relevant factors are 
possible objects of intervention or manipulation. This is not the case for the 
renormalization group explanation. In this case, one can still talk of variations making or 
failing to make a difference, but “making a difference” should not be understood in 
causal or interventionist terms.    
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them. In a similar way, whether a relatively “high level” neural network model correctly 
describes, say, memory recall in some structure in the temporal lobe may be independent 
of various facts about the detailed workings of ion channels in the neurons involved in 
this structure—“independent” in the sense that the workings of these channels might have 
been different, within some range of variation (e.g., having to do with biologically 
normal possibilities), consistently with the network structure behaving in the same way 
with respect to phenomena having to do with memory recall. Again, this does not mean 
that the behavior of the structure will be independent of all lower level detail—for 
example, it certainly matters to the behavior of the network that the neurons are not made 
of copper wire or constituted in such a way that they disintegrate when connected. Just as 
with critical point behavior, the idea is that lower level facts about neuronal behavior will 
impose constraints on what is possible in terms of higher level behavior, but that these 
constraints often will be relatively generic in the sense that a number of different low 
level variants will satisfy them. In this respect what we have, is a picture involving, so to 
speak, partial or constrained autonomy of the behavior of upper level systems from lower 
level features of realization, but not complete autonomy or independence.  
A second point worth making explicit is this: the picture just sketched requires 
that it be possible for a model or theory to explain some explananda having to do with 
some aspects of the behavior of a system without the model explaining explaining all 
such aspects. It is thus opposed to an alternative picture according to which to a theory 
that explains any explanandum satisfactorily must be a “theory of everything” that 
explains all aspects of the behavior of the system of interest, whatever the scale or level 
at which this is exhibited. In the neural case, for example, such a theory of everything 
would appeal to a single set of factors or principles that could be used to explain the 
detailed behavior of dendritic currents and ion channels in individual neurons, the overall 
behavior of large networks of neurons and everything in between. The alternative view 
which is implicit in the remarks from Dayan and Abbott and Trappenberg above is that in 
addition to being completely computationally intractable such a theory is not necessary to 
the extent that behavior at some levels does not depend on causal details at other levels. 
Instead, it is acceptable to operate with different models, each appropriate for explaining 
explananda at some level but not others. There will be constraint relationships among 
these models—they will not be completely independent of each other—but this is 
different from saying that our goal should be one big ur-model with maximal lower level 
detail encompassing everything
13
. 
                                                 
13
 Two additional points:   First, I do not mean to imply that “mechanists” like Kaplan 
and Craver are committed to such “a theory of everything” view.  The point of my 
remarks above  is  just  to make explicit some of the commitments of the picture I favor . 
Second, another way of putting matters is that on my view a model can, so to speak, 
designate a set of target explananda and say, in effect, that it is interested in explaining 
just these, rather than all behaviors at all scales exhibited by the system of interest. A 
model M that represents neurons as dimensionless points is, obviously, going to make 
radically false or no predictions concerning any phenomena P that depend on the fact that 
neurons are spatially extended, but it is legitimate for M to decline to take on the task of 
explaining P, if its target is some other set of explananda.  In other words, M should be 
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5. The Separation of Levels/Scales 
 
   The ideas just described would be less interesting and consequential if it were not 
for another broadly empirical fact. In principle, it is certainly possible that a huge number 
of different factors might turn out, empirically, to make a difference (and perhaps roughly 
the “same” difference, if we were able to devise some appropriate measure for this) to 
some set of target explananda. It is thus of great interest (and prima-facie surprising, as 
well as extremely fortunate for modeling purposes) that this is often not the case. Instead, 
it often turns out that there is some relatively small number of factors that make a 
difference or at least a substantial or non-trivial difference to a target set of explananda. 
Or, to express the idea slightly differently, it often turns out that we can group or 
segregate sets of explananda in such a way that different sets can be accounted for by 
different small sets of difference-making factors.  In physics,  these sets (of explananda 
and their accompanying difference-makers) are sometimes described as “domains” or  
“regimes” or “protectorates”   -- the idea being that certain explanatory factors and not 
others are “drivers” or represent the “dominant physics” for  certain domains while other 
explanatory factors are the primary drivers for explananda in other domains. In physics, 
the possibility of separating domains and dominant explanatory factors in this way is  
often connected to differences in the “scale”  (e.g., of length, time or energy) at which 
different factors are dominant or influential. That is, there often turn out to be factors that 
are very important to what happens physically at, say, very short length scales or at high 
energies but which we can entirely or largely ignore at longer length scales, where 
instead different factors (or at least factors characterized by different theories) become 
important. To take a very simple example, if we wish to understand what happens within 
an atomic nucleus, the strong and weak forces, which fall off very rapidly with distance 
are major determinants of many processes, and gravitational forces, which are very weak, 
are inconsequential. The opposite is true if one is interested in understanding the motion 
of galaxies, where gravity dominates. A similar point seems to hold for many biological 
phenomena, including phenomena involving the brain. Here too, considerations of scale –
both temporal and length scale – seem to operate in such a way that certain factors are 
important to understanding phenomena at some scales and not others, while models 
appealing to other factors are relevant at other scales
14
. For example, the detailed 
behavior of ion channels in a neuron requires modeling at length and temporal scales that 
are several orders of magnitude less than is appropriate for models of the behavior of an 
entire neuron in generating an action potential. This suggests the possibility of models 
                                                                                                                                                 
assessed in terms of whether it succeeds in explaining the explananda in its target 
domain.  
14
 One generic way in which this can happen is that factors that change very slowly with 
respect to the explananda of interest can be treated as effectively constant and hence (for 
some purposes) either ignored or modeled in a very simple way—by means of a single 
constant parameter. Another possibility is that some factor goes to equilibrium very 
quickly in comparison with   the time scale of the explanandum  of interest, in which case 
it may also be legitimate to treat it as constant.  
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that account for the latter without accounting for the former and vice-versa – a possibility 
described in more detail immediately below.  
 
6. Levels of Modeling in Neurobiology  
 
To illustrate the ideas in the preceding section in more detail, I turn to recent 
review paper entitled “Modeling Single-Neuron Dynamics and Computations: A Balance 
of Detail and Abstraction” (Herz et al. 2006). In this paper, the authors describe five 
different “levels” (there’s that word again) of single neuron modeling. At “level one” are 
“detailed compartment models” (in some cases consisting of more than 1000 
compartments
15
) which are “morphologically realistic” and “ focus on how the spatial 
structure of a neuron contributes to its dynamics and function”. The authors add, 
however, that “[a]lthough detailed compartmental models can approximate the dynamics 
of single neurons quite well, they suffer from several drawbacks. Their high 
dimensionality and intricate structure rule out any mathematical understanding of their 
emergent properties.” By contrast, “reduced [compartment] models [level two] with only 
one or few dendritic compartments overcome these problems and are often sufficient to 
understand somatodendritic interactions that govern spiking or bursting”. They add that 
“a well-matched task for such [reduced compartment] models is to relate behaviorally 
relevant computations on various time scales to salient features of neural structure and 
dynamics”, mentioning in this connection the modeling of binaural neurons in the 
auditory brainstem.  
 Level three comprises “single compartment models” with the Hodgkin-Huxley 
model being explicitly cited as an example. Herz et al. write: 
  
Single-compartment models such as the classic Hodgkin-Huxley model neglect 
the neuron’s spatial structure and focus entirely on how its various ionic currents 
contribute to subthreshold behavior and spike generation. These models have led 
to a quantitative understanding of many dynamical phenomena including phasic 
spiking, bursting, and spike-frequency adaptation (p. 82) 
 
They add that models in this class “explain why, for example, some neurons resemble 
integrate-and-fire elements or why the membrane potential of others oscillates in 
response to current injections enabling a ‘‘resonate-and-fire’’ behavior”, as well as other 
explananda (p. 82).  
Cascade models (level four) involving linear filters, non-linear transformations 
and explicit modeling of noise abstract even further from physiological details but “allow 
one to capture additional neural characteristics” such as those involved in adaptation to 
light intensity and contrast. Finally, “black box models” (level five) which may 
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 “Compartment” refers to the number of sections, represented by distinct sets of 
variables, into which the neuron is divided for modeling purposes—for example, the HH 
model is a “single compartment” model since the modeling is in terms of a single 
variable, voltage, which characterizes the behavior of the entire neural membrane. A 
multiple compartment model would have many different voltage variables for different 
parts of the membrane. 
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characterize the behavior of a neuron simply in terms of a probability distribution 
governing its an input/out relationships may be most appropriate if we “want to 
understand and quantify the signal-processing capabilities of a single neuron without 
considering its biophysical machinery. This approach may reveal general principles that 
explain, for example, where neurons place their operating points and how they alter their 
responses when the input statistics are modified.” (p. 83) Models at this level may be 
used to show, for example, how individual neurons shift their input-output curves in such 
a way as to achieve efficient coding.  
Several features of this discussion are worth particular emphasis. First, and most 
obviously there is explicit countenancing of models at number of “levels”, where the 
notion of level is tied to differences in spatial and temporal scale (a representation of the 
neuron as spatially extended, with different potentials in different spatial regions is 
required for understanding dendritic currents, but this scale of spatial representation may 
be not required for other purposes). Models at each level are explicitly recognized as 
being capable of providing “explanations”, “understanding” and the like, rather than 
models at some levels being regarded as merely descriptive or phenomenological in a 
way that contrasts with the genuinely “explanatory” models at other (presumably 
“lower”) levels. Moreover, these models are seen as complementary rather than in 
competition with each other, at least in part because they are seen aiming at different sets 
of explananda. There is no suggestion that we have to choose between modeling at a very 
fine-grained, detailed level (e.g., level one) or a more coarse-grained level (e.g., level 
four or five). Second, it is also recognized that which modeling level is most appropriate 
depends on the phenomena one wants to explain and that is not true that models with 
more details (or even more mechanistically relevant details) are always better, regardless 
of what one is trying to explain, although for some purposes highly detailed models are 
just what is called for
16
. For example, if one’s goal is to understand how the details of the 
anatomy and spatial structure of an individual neuron influence its detailed dynamics, a 
model at level one may be most appropriate. If one wants a “quantitative understanding” 
of spike train behavior, a model at a higher level (e.g., level three) may be better.   This 
would be better in the sense that the details invoked in a level one model may be such 
that they are irrelevant to (make no difference for) this phenomenon. Again, the goal is 
taken to be the inclusion of just enough detail to account for what it is one is trying to 
explain but not more:  
  
 All these [modeling] tasks require a delicate balance between incorporating 
sufficient details to account for complex single-cell dynamics and reducing this 
complexity to the essential characteristics to make a model tractable. The 
appropriate level of description depends on the particular goal of the model. 
Indeed, finding the best abstraction level is often the key to success. (p. 80)  
 
 7. Mechanistic Explanation  
                                                 
16
  Once again, my goal in these remarks is the positive one of highlighting a feature of 
good explanatory practice in neuroscience. I do not mean to imply that mechanistic 
approaches  are unable to incorporate this feature, but rather to emphasize that they 
should.   
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  So far I have discussed “explanation” but have said nothing about distinctively 
“mechanistic” explanations and how these relate to the ideas just described. Although, for 
reasons that will emerge below, I don’t think that “mechanistic explanation” is a notion 
with sharp boundaries, I fully agree that these are one important variety of explanation in 
many areas of biology and neuroscience. Roughly speaking, I see these as explanations 
meeting certain specific conditions M (described immediately below) that lead us to think 
of them as “mechanistic”, where satisfying M is one way of meeting the general 
interventionist conditions on explanation. However, I also think that it is possible for a 
theory or model to fail to satisfy conditions M and still qualify as explanatory in virtue of 
meeting these more general conditions.  
 At the level of methodology, if not underlying metaphysics, my general picture 
of mechanisms and mechanistic explanation is fairly close to that advanced by other 
writers, such as Machamer, Darden and Craver (2000) and Bechtel and Abrahamsen 
(2005). Consider a system S that exhibits behavior B – the phenomenon we want to 
explain. A mechanistic explanation involves decomposing S into components or parts 
(“entities” in the parlance of Machamer, Darden and Craver (2000)), which exhibit 
characteristic patterns of causal interaction with one another, describable by 
generalizations Gi (describing “activities”). Explanation then proceeds by showing how B 
results from these interactions, in a way that satisfies the interventionist conditions on 
causal explanation. This in turn involves showing how variations or changes in the parts 
or in the generalizations governing them would result in alternatives to B, thereby 
allowing us to see how the behaviors of the parts and the way in which they interact make 
a difference for (or are relevant to) whether B holds. Part of the attraction of explanations 
that are mechanistic in this sense is that this information about the parts and their 
interactions can guide more fine-grained interventions that might affect behavior B – a 
point that is spelled out in detail in Woodward (2002) and Kaplan and Craver (2011).  
 Explanations having this general character often, and perhaps even typically, 
satisfy several other related conditions. One of these, which I have discussed elsewhere 
(Woodward 2003) is a modularity condition: modularity requires that the different causal 
generalizations Gi describing the causal relations among the parts should at least to some 
degree be capable of changing independently of each other. Versions of modularity are 
often explicitly or implicitly assumed in the “box (or node) and arrow” representations 
that are adopted in many different disciplines for the representation of mechanisms, with 
modularity corresponding to the idea that arrows into one node can be disrupted without 
disrupting arrows into other nodes. Arguably, satisfaction of a modularity condition is 
also required if we are to make sense of the idea that mechanistic explanation involves 
decomposition of S into distinct “parts” with distinctive generalizations characterizing the 
behavior of parts and the interactions into which they enter. If the alleged parts can’t be 
changed or modified (at least in principle) independently of each other or if no local 
changes can affect the pattern of interaction of some of the parts without holistically 
altering all of the parts and their interactions, then talk of decomposing the behavior of 
the system into interactions among its “parts” seems at best metaphorical. In practice, the 
most straightforward cases in which modularity conditions are satisfied seem to be those 
in which a mechanical explanation provides information about spatio-temporally separate 
parts and their spatio-temporal relations, since distinctness of spatio-temporal location is 
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very closely tied to the possibility of independent modifiability. For example, the spatio-
temporal separation of the different classes of ion channels (Na and K channels)  in the 
Hodgkin-Huxley model discussed in section 9 is one reason why it is natural to think of 
that model as involving a representation of independently modifiable parts that interact to 
produce the action potential and thus to think of the HH model as in this respect a 
“mechanical” model17. 
 A second feature possessed by explanations that we most readily regard as 
mechanistic (or at least a feature that, reasonably enough, philosophers favorable to 
mechanism often take to be characteristic of mechanistic explanations) is a kind of 
sensitivity of behavior to details (material and organizational) of implementation/ 
realization/composition. Consider some ordinary machine (e.g., a clock). For such a 
machine to function as it was designed to, these components must be connected up to one 
another in a relatively spatio-temporally precise way. Moreover, the details of the 
behavior of the parts also matter – we do not expect to be able to replace a gear in a clock 
with a gear of different size or different spacing to teeth and get the same result. Indeed, 
this is why we need to invoke such details to explain the behavior of these systems: the 
details make a difference for how such systems behave. It is systems of this sort for 
which “mechanistic” explanation (or at least the kind of mechanistic explanation that 
invokes considerable implementational detail) seems particularly appropriate.
18
  
Putting these requirements together, we get the claim that mechanical 
explanations are those that satisfy the interventionist requirements in section 2, which 
involve decomposition into parts (where the notion of part is usually understood spatio-
temporally), and which are appropriate to systems whose behavior is sensitive to details 
of material realization and organization. Since satisfaction of this last condition, in 
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 My claim here is that modularity and decomposition into independently changeable 
parts are conditions that are most readily satisfied when “part” is understood in spatio-
temporal terms, but for purposes of this paper, I leave open the question of whether 
decomposition (and hence mechanistic explanation) might also be understood in a way 
that does not require spatio-temporal localizability of parts. (Bechtel and Richardson 
(1993) were among the first to talk about this kind of decomposition, which they called 
functional decomposition.) Cognitive psychology employs a number of different 
strategies that seek to decompose overall cognitive processes into distinct cognitive 
processes, components or modules (e.g., Sternberg 2001), but typically without providing 
information about the spatial location of those parts, although usually there is appeal to 
information about temporal relationships. Assessment of these strategies is beyond the 
scope of this paper, although I will say that the strategies require strong empirical 
background assumptions and that proposals about decompositions of cognitive processes 
into components often face severe under-determination problems in the absence of 
information about neural realization (which does provide relevant spatial information).  
(See also Piccinini and Craver 2011 for a discussion of closely related issues.] 
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 These features of sensitivity to details of organization and composition as characteristic 
of mechanical explanation are also emphasized in Levy (forthcoming) and in Levy and 
Bechtel (forthcoming). Woodward (2008) also distinguishes systems that are realization 
sensitive from those that are not, although not in the context of a discussion of 
mechanistic explanation.  
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particular, is a matter of degree, we should not expect sharp boundaries between 
mechanistic and non-mechanistic forms of explanation, although there will be clear 
enough cases. (The absence of such sharp boundaries is itself one reason for thinking that 
is misguided to suppose that only theories meeting mechanistic constraints explain—the 
notion of mechanisticl explanation is not sufficiently sharply bounded to play this sort of 
demarcational role.)  
We have already noted many cases in which, in contrast to the mechanistic 
possibilities just described, we need to invoke only very limited information about the 
details of material realization or spatio-temporal organization to explain aspects of the 
behavior of a system. For example, the explanation of universal behavior near critical 
points in terms of the renormalization group does not appeal to the details of the 
composition of the particular materials involved, for the very good reason that such 
behavior does not depend on these details. In part for this reason, it seems unintuitive to 
describe the renormalization group explanation as a “mechanistic”. Certainly it is not 
mechanistic in the sense of that notion employed by writers like Craver. Nonetheless the 
renormalization group analysis seems explanatory. Previous sections have also noted the 
existence of many “higher level” explanatory neurobiological models and theories that 
abstract away from many neural details. To the extent such models are relatively 
insensitive to material or organizational details of implementation or to the extent they do 
not involve decomposition of the system modeled into distinct parts with characteristic 
patterns of interaction, the models will seem also seem comparatively less mechanistic.  
As an additional illustration, consider the very common use of models involving 
recurrent networks with auto-associative features to explain phenomena like retrieval of 
memories from partial cues. Such models represent neurons (or perhaps even populations 
of neurons) as individual nodes, the connections of which form directed cycles, with 
every node being connected to every other node in a fully recurrent network. In a separate 
training phase, the network produces, via a process of Hebbian learning, an output which 
resembles (imperfectly) some previously acquired trained pattern. This output is then fed 
back into the network, resulting in a pattern that is closer to the trained pattern. During 
the retrieval phase, presentation of just part of the input pattern will lead, via the auto-
associative process just described, to more and more of the learned pattern. The process 
by which the network settles into a state corresponding to this previously learned pattern 
can be understood as involving movement into an attractor state in an attractive 
landscape, the shape of which is specified by the dynamical equations describing the 
operation of the network. Networks of this sort have been used to model a number of 
psychological or neurobiological processes including the recall of complete memories 
from partial cues (See, e.g. Trappenberg, 2002). Processing of this kind is often 
associated with brain structures such as the hippocampus. Such models obviously abstract 
away from many neural details, and in this respect are relatively non-mechanistic in 
Craver’s sense.19 On my view, however, we should not conclude that they are 
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 To the extent that such models explain in terms of generic facts about the structure of 
attractive landscapes and so on, they also involve abstraction away from the details of 
individual trajectories taken by the system in reaching some final state. That is, the 
explanation for why the system ends up in some final state has to do with, e.g. this being 
in a basin of attraction for the landscape, with the details of the exact process by which 
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unexplanatory for this reason alone. Instead their explanatory status depends on whether 
they accurately capture the dependency relations in real neural structures. This depends in 
turn on whether the modeled neural structures have the connectivity of a recurrent 
network, whether they involve Hebbian associative learning, whether there is empirical 
support for separate training and retrieval phases, and so on
20
.    
  
 8. Mechanism, Predictivism and Instrumentalism 
 
   So far I have not addressed an important set of objections, due to Craver and 
others, to the ideas just defended. These objections turn on the claim that if we abandon 
the idea that explanation (at least in neuroscience) must be mechanistic, we lose the 
ability to make various important distinctions. For example, we lose the distinction 
between, on the one hand, purely descriptive or phenomenological models, and, on the 
other hand, explanatory models. We also lose the related distinction between the use of 
models, construed instrumentally merely for predictive purposes, and their use under 
realistic construals to explain. Craver argues, for example, that without the mechanistic 
constraints on explanation that he favors, we will be forced to regard Ptolemaic 
astronomy or models that merely postulate correlations as explanatory. Although it 
should be obvious from my discussion above that I disagree with many of these claims, I 
also think that they raise many interesting issues that are especially in need of discussion 
with the interventionist framework, since they often turn on what can be a possible target 
of intervention, when a model can be thought of as telling us what would happen under 
interventions, and when a model provides information about dependency relations in the 
relevant sense. In what follows I explore some of the different ways in which, from an 
interventionist perspective, a model may be merely descriptive or phenomenological 
rather than explanatory. This will give us a sort of catalog of different ways in which 
models can be explanatorily deficient, but, as we shall also see, a model can avoid these 
deficiencies without being mechanical.  
(1) Obviously one straightforward way in which the interventionist requirements 
can be violated is that the factors cited in some candidate explanans correspond to “real” 
features F in the world, but the model should not be understood as even attempting to  
describe how explanandum E responds to interventions on those features or as describing 
a dependency relation (in the relevant sense) between F and E. This will be the case, for 
example, for models in which the relationship between F and E is (and is understood to 
be) purely correlational rather than causal. For example, a model might represent the 
correlation between barometer readings B and the occurrence S of a storm, and this 
representation may be descriptively accurate and predictively useful even though the B- S 
relationship is not causal. The non-causal, non-explanatory status of such a model 
follows, within the interventionist framework, from the fact that the model does not tell 
us how (or even whether) S will change under interventions on B or about a dependency 
                                                                                                                                                 
the system falls into that state being omitted from the model. This is arguably another 
respect in which the system departs from some of the expectations we have about 
mechanical explanations, since specific trajectories are often taken to matter for these.  
20
 For additional relevant discussion concerning  a different neural network model (the 
Zipser- Andersen  Gain Field model) see Kaplan, 2011,Section 7.  
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relation between B and S.  Note that reaching this judgment does not require acceptance 
of the idea that only models that are mechanistic in the sense of section 7 above or that 
provide lots of implementational detail explain: a model that abstracts away from such 
detail can nonetheless describe relationships that are causal in the interventionist sense 
(or that are explanatory in the sense of describing dependency relationships) and a purely 
correlational model might include lots of detail about the material composition of the 
modeled system and the spatio-temporal organization of its parts.  
(2) A different, and in some respects more interesting, kind of case arises when a 
theory or model is interpreted as (or purports to) describe dependency relationships that 
but these completely fail to track the actual dependency relations operative  the system 
whose behavior the theory purports to explain. Of course models of this sort can 
nonetheless be descriptively accurate and predictively useful to the extent that they 
correctly represent correlational patterns among variables 
 A plausible example of this possibility, discussed by Kaplan and Craver (2011) is 
Ptolemaic astronomy. According to this theory (at least in the cartoon version we 
consider here) the planets move as they do because they are carried around in their orbits 
by revolving crystalline spheres centered on the earth, or by additional crystalline spheres 
(“epicycles”) whose centers move on the geocentric revolving spheres.   It is 
uncontroversial that nothing like such spheres exists and that the motions of the planets 
do not depend on their being carried around on such spheres. There is thus no legitimate 
interventionist interpretation of Ptolemaic astronomy as correctly telling us what would 
happen to the planetary orbits if interventions were to occur on such spheres (e.g., by 
changing their rates of revolution or disrupting them in some way.)  Nor does this theory 
provide other sorts of explanatorily relevant information about dependency relationships.   
not exist
21
.   It follows that Ptolemaic astronomy does not qualify as an explanatory 
theory within the interventionist framework. It is a purely phenomenological (or 
descriptive) theory, although for somewhat different reasons than the barometer 
reading/storm “theory” discussed under section 1 above.  
  The case of Ptolemaic astronomy seems clear enough but there are many other 
examples involving  models with “unrealistic” elements that raise subtle and interesting 
questions regarding their explanatory status. Although I lack the space for detailed 
discussion, my general view is that a model can contain many features that do not directly 
correspond to  or mirror features of a target system  but  nonetheless be explanatory in 
virtue of correctly characterizing dependency relations governing that system.  On my 
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 I would thus reject (as a general condition on explanation) condition (a) in Kaplan and 
Craver’s 3M requirement, which holds in that “[i]n successful explanatory models in 
cognitive and systems neuroscience (a) the variables in the model correspond to 
components, activities, properties, and organizational features of the target mechanism 
that produces, maintains, or underlies the phenomenon…” (p. 611).  I am much more 
sympathetic to their second condition (b), when properly interpreted: “(b) the (perhaps 
mathematical) dependencies posited among these variables in the model correspond to 
the (perhaps quantifiable) causal relations among the components of the target 
mechanism”. I will add, though, that condition (a) may have more plausibility when 
construed more narrowly as a requirement on what it means for an explanation to be 
“mechanistic”.    
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view, what matters most for purposes of explanation is that the model correctly 
characterizes dependency relations relevant to the explananda we  are trying to explain.   
That  the model may misrepresent  other dependency relations relevant to other 
explananda  that the model does not attempt to explain or that it mischaracterizes in some 
respects (or cannot be taken literally in what it says regarding) the entities or properties 
standing in those relations often matters less much from the point of view of explanation. 
To take a simple example, a network model in which neurons are represented as 
interconnected dimensionless points may nonetheless correctly describe what would 
happen to the network or how it would behave under various changes in the inputs 
delivered to those neurons (so that the model is explanatory with respect to these 
explananda),  even though it is of course true that neurons are not dimensionless points 
and some predictions based on this assumption will be obviously mistaken. As another 
illustration,  it is arguable Bohr’s model of the atom had some explanatory force in virtue 
of correctly representing the dependency of the emission spectrum for hydrogen on 
transitions between electronic energy levels (and the dependency of the latter on the 
absorption of photons), even though in other respects the model was representationally 
quite inaccurate.  For this reason, I do not think that it is correct to claim that if model is 
to provide satisfactory explanations all of the variables   in the model must correspond 
directly to entities or properties that are present in the target system
22
. Models can 
successfully convey dependency information in surprisingly indirect ways that do not 
require this sort of  mirroring or correspondence of  individual elements in  the model to 
elements in the world. I acknowledge that this introduces a certain vagueness or 
indeterminacy into assessments of explanatory status (when is a model so far “off” in 
what it claims about the target system that we should regard it as unexplanatory) but I 
believe this to be unavoidable.   
3) Yet another possibility is that a theory or model might be merely descriptive in 
the sense that it describes or summarizes a pattern in some body of data in terms of 
variables X, Y etc, but without any suggestion that these variables are related causally in 
the interventionist sense. For example, a model according to which the distribution of 
velocities of molecules in a gas is Gaussian is merely descriptive in this sense, as is a 
model according to which the receptive fields of neurons can be represented by the 
difference between two Gaussians—an example considered in Kaplan and Craver (2011). 
A closely related possibility is that the model simply describes some regularly occurring 
phenomenon but without telling us anything about the factors on which the occurrence of 
that phenomenon depends, as was the case for the “phenomenological” representation of 
neural tuning curves discussed in section 2.  
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 To put the point in a slightly different way, whether a model gets the underlying 
ontology of the target system right and whether it conveys correct information abut 
dependency relations and the answers to what-if things- had been –different questions are 
much more independent of one another than many philosophers suppose.  On my view, it 
is the latter (getting the appropriate relationships rather than the relata) that matter for 
explanation. A version of the wave theory of light that conveys correct information about 
relationships (including intervention supporting relationships) involved in reflection, 
refraction, diffraction and so on should be regarded as explanatory even if the theory 
represents waves themselves as mechanical displacements in an ether.  
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(4) The model might describe a predictively useful relationship which involves one or 
more variables that are not, for logical or conceptual reasons, possible targets for 
intervention. An illustration (due to Kaplan 2011) is provided by the Balmer formula 
which gives the wavelength ( ) of lines in the absorption/emission spectrum of hydrogen  
in terms of the relation:  = B (m2/m2-4) where B is a constant and m an integer greater 
than two. This relationship is not a causal relationship, at least according to the 
interventionist account, since the notion of intervening to change the value of m from one 
integral value to another does not make sense. We cannot interpret the Balmer formula as 
telling us what would happen to  under interventions on the number m. Nor does this 
seem to be a case of a dependency relationship of any other kind relevant to explanation.  
(5) Another possible way in which the interventionist requirements can fail is that 
a theory or model can be so unclear or non-committal about how some of the terms or 
variables in the theory are to be interpreted (or what features they correspond to in the 
world) that we have no conception of what would constitute an intervention on those 
features, what would happen under such an intervention, or even what would be involved 
in those features varying or being different. (This possibility contrasts with the case of 
Ptolemaic astronomy described under 2)  since it seems clear in a general way what 
crystalline spheres would be were they to exist, and what would be involved in their 
varying in diameter and position and so on.) An extreme case is a theory which is just a 
mathematical structure or an entirely uninterpreted set of equations relating certain 
variables. To the extent that the theory does not specify at al what structures or relations 
in the world are supposed to correspond to the dependency relationships postulated in the 
theory, then, according to the interventionist framework, it is not even a candidate for an 
explanatory theory. (For example, the HH model, considered simply as a set of equations 
without any physical interpretation, is not even a candidate for an explanation.) Another, 
less extreme possibility along these lines is that the theory does not contain completely 
uninterpreted variables and relationships but instead provides some characterization of 
these, perhaps giving them a semantic label or even assigning a number to them, 
estimated from other measured quantities, but nonetheless leaves their physical or wordly 
interpretation sufficiently underspecified that we lack any clear conception of what would 
be involved in intervening on them or what corresponds in the target system to the 
dependency relations in which they figure.   The “gating’ variables fitted by Hodgkin and 
Huxley to the expressions describing the voltage and time dependencies of sodium and 
potassium channels in their model of the generation of the action potential had something 
of this character, as discussed below (Section 9)
 
.  
Another related possibility is represented by the treatment of bimanual 
coordination by Haken et al. 1985 (the HKB model), which is championed by Chemero 
and Silberstein,  2008  as an alternative to more standard mechanistic or computational 
accounts of psychological and neuroscience explanation. When subjects attempt to move 
their left and right index fingers in phase in time with a metronome, their movements are 
found to be related by  
 
   (8.1) dØ/dt= - a sinØ -2b sin 2 Ø  
 
where Ø is the relative phase angle between the two fingers and b/a reflects the finger 
oscillating frequencies. It is readily seen that this equation permits just two stable 
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outcomes, when either Ø = 0 or Ø= 180 degrees, corresponding to the movement of 
fingers either in-phase (parallel, like windshield wipers) or in anti-phase. As b/a 
decreases (corresponding to faster finger oscillation), subjects are unable to maintain the 
antiphase movement and switch to the in-phase movement, with this being regarded as a 
“phase transition”. This behavior is reflected in the basins of attraction associated with 
(8.1); there are two attractors (at Ø = 0 or Ø= 180) when b/a is relatively large and just 
one when this ratio is small. 
I agree with Kaplan and Craver (2011) that it is difficult to see this as a causal or 
as an explanatory model
23
. To begin with, it does not purport to tell us anything about the 
neural features on which the described behavior depends—in this respect, it seems like a 
non-starter as an example of neuroscientific or psychological explanation and, contrary to 
what Chemero and Silberstein claim, a dubious candidate for a replacement for such 
explanations. Because there is no accompanying neural account (indeed, as far as the 
model itself goes, no claim about whether such an account even exists), it is unclear how, 
if at all, to interpret the HKB model as a causal or explanatory model. As far as the model 
and the accompanying experimental data go, the restricted possible states of coupled 
finger movement and the “phase transition” might be due to some common 
neural/nervous system cause, in which case these aspects of the phenomenon will have 
more of the character of a correlation among joint effects than a causal relationship. 
Indeed, Kelso himself in his 1984 paper proposes that the relation (8.1) may be regarded 
as “constrain[ing] possible neural explanations” (p. 93) of the facts about finger 
movement he describes, which suggests that (8.1) has more of the status of a potential 
explanandum for a genuinely explanatory theory (or an empirical constraint on such a 
theory) grounded in more general features of the brain or nervous system, rather than 
something which should itself be regarded as explanatory
24
.  
The cases 1-5 are all cases in which the interventionist requirements for 
explanation are not met. Note, however, that none are cases in which a theory or model 
fails to be explanatory simply because it fails to provide extensive mechanistic or 
implementational detail. Instead, at least from an interventionist perspective, the models 
under 1-5 fail to be explanatory for other, independent reasons – because they invoke 
merely correlational relationships or non-existent or woefully underspecified dependence 
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 Although I do not regard the HKB model as a plausible example of an explanatory 
psychological/neuroscientific model rooted in dynamic systems theory, I emphasize, as 
argued above, that in my view it would be a mistake to suppose that all dynamic systems 
accounts of brain function in terms of attractor landscapes and the like are non-
explanatory. In addition to the theories of memory retrieval mentioned above, other 
plausible candidates for explanatory models involving dynamic systems theory include 
accounts of categorization and decision-making of the sort described in Rolls and Deco, 
2010.  
24
  I will also add that the motivation for (1) in Haken et al’s (1985) paper also does not 
seem to have much to do with distinctively causal considerations. Instead (8.1) is 
motivated by perceived “analogies” (rooted in “synergetics”) with the behavior of other 
sorts of physical systems exhibiting phase transitions, with (1) described as the 
“simplest” equation (p. 47) of a certain general form subject to certain symmetry 
constraints that fits the observed data describing finger movements.  
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relations and so on. In other words, we can explain what is explanatorily defective about 
such models in terms of violations of basic interventionist/dependency requirements on 
explanation without invoking the idea that all explanations must be mechanistic. To the 
extent that a model avoids the problems described under 1-5 above, and satisfies the 
interventionist constraints on explanation, it will count as explanatory even if it fails to be 
mechanistic. For example, depending on the details of the case, a recurrent network 
model for auto-associative memory may describe genuine dependence relations in a 
target system  (a brain) in the interventionist sense, rather than just correlations and the 
items related via these dependence relations—neurons, connections among neurons and 
neural activity – may be “real” and possible objects of intervention. It may also be clear 
enough what would be involved in intervening on such a structure (e.g. by changing its 
input or more dramatically by lesioning it) so the model is not one in which it is left 
completely unclear or unspecified what in the world corresponds to relevant variables.  
Similarly it may be clear enough what the relationships postulated in the model imply 
about what would happen in the target system under various manipulations or 
perturbations. On the other hand, the model lacks implementational or mechanistic detail, 
thus illustrating the independence of this feature from the kinds of deficiencies 
represented by 1-5.  
 
9. The Hodgkin-Huxley Model  
 Many of the themes discussed above are illustrated by the Hodgkin-Huxley 
(hereafter HH) model, to which I now turn. This has been the subject of a considerable 
recent discussion, with some (e.g., Craver 2008 and Bogen 2008) regarding the model as 
unexplanatory (or in Craver’s case, at best an explanation sketch) because of its failure to 
provide various sorts of mechanistic detail and others (Weber 2008, Levy, forthcoming) 
defending the explanatory status of the model. As will be seen, my own assessment is 
very close to that of Weber and Levy, and I will draw on both of their discussions in what 
follows.  
 I take the goal of HH’s 1952 paper to be the presentation of a model of the 
generation of the action potential in an individual neuron. The experiments HH report 
were conducted on the giant axion of the squid, although it is assumed that many of the 
features of the model apply much more generally. The explanandum of the model is a 
phenomenon or stylized fact (in the sense described in section 3) having to do with shape 
of the action potential— what Trappenberg calls the “prototypical form of the action 
potential” (p. 33). This involves a change in the potential across the neuron’s membrane 
which follows a characteristic pattern: first rising sharply to a positive value from the 
resting potential of the neuron (depolarization) and then decreasing sharply to below the 
resting potential, followed by a recovery to the resting potential. The action potential 
results from changes in the conductance of the membrane to sodium and potassium ions, 
with the rise in potential being due to opening of Na channels in the membrane leading to 
the influx in Na ions and the subsequent fall being due to the inactivation of the sodium 
channels approximately 1ms after their opening and the opening at this point of the 
potassium channels. These ionic currents are responsible for the patterns of change in 
membrane potential. Furthermore the channels themselves are “voltage-gated” with the 
channel resistances/ conductances being influenced by the membrane potential.  
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The basic idea of the H-H model is that structural features of the neuron 
responsible for the action potential may be represented by a circuit diagram with the 
following structure: 
 
 
Figure 1 here 
 
 
This is a circuit in parallel with (reading from left to right) a capacitor which stores 
charge (the potential across the membrane functions as a capacitor), a channel
25
 that 
conducts the sodium current INa, with an associated time and voltage dependent 
conductance gNa, a channel that conducts a potassium current IK with time and voltage 
dependent conductance gK, and a leakage current Il which is assumed to be time and 
voltage independent. The relationships governing these quantities are represented by HH 
by means of a set of differential equations. First, the total membrane current I is written 
as the sum of the capacitor current and the total ionic current Ii: 
 
 I= CmdV/dT+ Ii (This is just a version of Kirchoff’s law for the conservation of charge.) 
 
The ionic current in turn is the sum Ii = INa + IK +Il  
 
These last three currents can be written as INa = gNa (V-VNa) , IK = gK (V-VK) , and Il =gl 
(V-Vl) where VNa, Vk, Vl are the equilibrium membrane potentials. These are just versions 
of Ohm’s law, with the currents being equal to the products of the conductances and the 
difference between the membrane potential and the equilibrium potential. The ionic 
conductances in turn are expressed as the product of the maximum conductances (which I 
will write as G*Na etc. for the channels) times “gating” variables n, m, and h:  
 
G k = G*K n
4
  
GNa= G*Nam
3
h 
 
The underlying picture is that the passage of ions through a channel requires the opening 
of a number of distinct hypothetical structures or “gates”, with the gating variables 
representing the probability that these are open. For example, n represents the probability 
that a gate in the potassium channel is open, it is assumed that four distinct gates must be 
open for the passage of the potassium current, and also that these gates open 
independently, so that n
4
 is in effect the probability that the potassium channel is open. 
G*K n
4
 thus yields an expression for the active or available conductive as a function of 
the maximum conductance. Variables m and h have similar interpretations: the Na current 
requires that three gates, each with probability m, be open and that a distinct gate also be 
open with probability h. Other equations, not reproduced here, describe the time 
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 As noted above,  the channels which these variables in the H-H model  describe are  
really (from a molecular perspective)  aggregates or classes of channels of various types 
(Na etc.) rather than individual ion currents.  
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derivatives of the gating variables n etc. as functions of other variables such as the 
voltage dependent opening and closing rates of the gates.  
 
Combining these equations yields:  
 
(9.1) I = CMdV/dt + G*Kn
4
(V − VK) + G*Na m
3
h(V − VNa) + Gl(V − Vl) 
 
 G*Na and G*K are directly measured variables but, by HH’s own account, the gating 
variables (and the variables occurring in the differential equations describing how these 
change with time) were chosen on the basis that they fit the experimental data reasonably 
well and were simple. Lacking information about the details of the molecular 
mechanisms governing the operation of the channels, HH in effect settled for expressions 
(the quantities m, n and h, the powers to which these are raised, and the equations 
specifying the time course of these) that accurately empirically described the channel 
conductances, and, although they speculated on possible physical interpretations for these 
expressions, they did not claim that they had successfully identified the mechanisms 
responsible for them. They write “ the success of the equations26 is no evidence in favor 
of the mechanism of permeability changes [i.e. changes in membrane conductance] that 
we tentatively had in mind when formulating them” (p.  541). On the other hand, the 
passage just quoted is immediately followed by this remark (also quoted by Weber and 
by Levy):  
  
The point that we do consider to be established is that fairly simple permeability 
changes in response to alterations in membrane potential, of the kind deduced 
from the voltage clamp results, are a sufficient explanation of the wide range of 
phenomena that have been fitted by solutions of the equations. (p. 541) 
 
Indeed, their entire 1952 paper is full of language strongly suggesting that they think of 
themselves as having provided a causal explanation or a causal account of the action 
potential. Their introductory paragraph says that their model “will account for 
conductance and excitation in quantitative terms” (p. 500) and the first page of their 
paper contains language like the following: 
 
Each component of the ionic current is determined by a driving force which may 
conveniently be measured as an electrical potential difference and a permeability 
coefficient. (p.500, emphasis added)  
 
The influence of membrane potential on permeability can be summarized by 
stating: first, that depolarization causes a transient increase in sodium 
conductance and a slower but maintained increase in potassium conductance; 
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 I follow Weber in interpreting the reference to “the equations” in this passage to the 
equations HH propose describing the dependence of the channel conductances on m, n, 
and h and to the equations describing the time dependence of the latter, rather than to the 
equation (9.1)  
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secondly, that these changes are graded and that they can be reversed by 
repolarizing the membrane. (p. 500, emphasis added) 
 
 They go on to say that:  
 
In order to decide whether these effects are sufficient to account for complicated 
phenomena such as the action potential and refractory period, it is necessary to 
obtain expressions relating the sodium and potassium conductances to time and 
membrane potential (page 500-1, emphasis added) 
 
 The judgment that the HH model is explanatory is repeated in many if not most of 
the papers and texts I consulted that contain explications of the model. For example, in 
the passage quoted from Herz et al. above (Section 6), the HH model is described as 
“explaining” and providing “quantitative understanding”. McCormack (2003) writes that 
the experiments and model in the 1952 paper “explained qualitatively and quantitatively 
the ionic mechanism by which the action potential is generated” (p. 145). Koch (1999) 
writes that “the biophysical mechanisms and underlying action potential generation in the 
cell body of both vertebrates and invertebrates can be understood and modeled by the 
formalism Hodgkin and Huxley introduced..” (p. 144).27 Similarly, Trappenberg (2002, 
pp 34ff) repeatedly characterizes the HH model as describing the “mechanism” (or 
“minimal mechanism’) for the generation of the action potential. 
I follow both Weber and Levy in holding that the obvious way of reconciling 
HH’s various remarks about the explanatory status of their model is to distinguish the 
question of whether HH provided (i) an explanation of the generation of the action 
potential from the issue of whether they provided (ii) a satisfactory explanation of the 
operation of the ion channels and the molecular mechanisms involved in gating. Both by 
their own account and judged in the light of subsequent understanding of the operation of 
the ion channels, they do not provide (ii). However, as argued in previous sections, this is 
consistent with their having provided an explanation of (i) the generation of the action 
potential. Put at a very general level, this is because the equation (9.1) and the associated 
model identifies the factors (or at least many of the factors) on which the generation of 
the action potential depends, although it does not successfully identify (or at least very 
fully or adequately identify) the factors on which the operation of the ion channels 
depends. The possibility of explaining (i) without explaining (ii) can be thought of as 
reflection of the general point, made in previous sections in connection with modeling 
strategies, that models work at different levels or scales, and a model can explain some 
explananda at a particular scale or level (the overall behavior of behavior of a neuron in 
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 I should also acknowledge, though, that this remark by Koch is followed shortly by a 
reference to the “phenomenological model.. of the events underlying the generation of the 
action potential” (144-5) postulated by HH, which seems to mix together the claim that 
the model provides causal information (“generation”) with a description of it as 
“phenomenological”. This makes sense if “phenomenological” in this context just means 
“lacking lower level mechanistic detail” (which is not taken to imply that the account is 
non-causal or non-explanatory). This is perhaps the sense in which classical 
thermodynamics is a “phenomenological” theory.  
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generating an action potential) without explaining aspects of neural behavior at other 
scales or levels (the molecular mechanisms associated with the ion channels).  
 As Trappenberg suggests, one way of thinking of the HH model is as a kind of 
minimal model of the generation of the action potential. The HH model shows that the 
generation of the action potential depends on (or requires at a minimum), among other 
things, the existence of at least two voltage gated and time-dependent ion channels, as 
well as an additional static or leakage channel and a membrane that is otherwise 
sufficiently insulated to act as a capacitor. However, given that such a structure is present 
and behaves appropriately, the presence of the specific mechanism by which the ion 
channels in the giant squid operates is not required for the generation of the action 
potential, as long as some mechanism or other that plays this role is present. This in effect 
allows for the separation of explanatory tasks (i) and (ii) in the manner that I have 
described.  
  This assessment of the explanatory status of the HH model also follows from the 
interventionist requirements on explanation described in section 2 – a point that is also 
developed by Weber (2008). For example, the HH model correctly describes what will 
happen to the total current I under interventions on the transmembrane voltage V (which 
can be accomplished experimentally via the voltage clamp device), and under changes in 
the maximum sodium and potassium channel conductances, which can be accomplished 
by techniques for molecular manipulation of these. Although the HH model does not 
correctly describe the molecular mechanisms involved in the operation of ion channels, it 
does claim, correctly, that it should be possible to intervene on these classes of channels 
independently and to change the individual currents, INa and IK, independently of each 
other and independently of the other terms in equation. The equation and associated 
correctly describes what would happen to the total current under such interventions. The 
HH model is thus (at least in this respect) modular and effects a decomposition of the 
structure responsible for the membrane current into components, each of which is 
governed by generalizations which operate independently of the generalizations 
governing the other components. In this sense it seems fairly natural to characterize the 
HH model as describing the “mechanism” of the action potential, as a number of the 
writers quoted above do.  
   We may also note that, putting aside the role of the gating terms and the 
equations governing them, the HH model does not exhibit any of the pathologies 
described in section 8 which render a model merely descriptive or phenomenological 
rather than explanatory. In particular, the HH model does not (i) describe a relationship 
(between I and terms like V, INa,..) that is purely correlational rather than causal in the 
interventionist sense. Moreover, with the partial exception of the gating terms, the 
relations among other terms conveys information about dependency relations in the target 
system. For instance, V, the various currents, the membrane capacitance, and the sodium 
and potassium conductances all refer to features of the world that are   “real” in the sense 
that they can be measured and manipulated and the model correctly describes how these 
features are related (via intervention-supporting dependency relations)  to one another in 
the target system. In these respects, the HH model is very different from the Ptolemaic 
model.  
 
10. Conclusion. 
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In this paper I have attempted to use an interventionist framework to argue that 
theories and models in neurobiology that abstract away from lower level or 
implementational detail can nonetheless be explanatory. I have tried to show that this 
conclusion does not require that one abandon the distinction between models that are 
explanatory and those that are merely descriptive or predictively accurate, but non-
explanatory. Instead interventionism provides a natural framework for capturing this 
distinction. I have also argued that mechanistic models are just one possible form of 
explanatory model; they are explanations that meet certain additional conditions that 
qualify them as “mechanistic”. Models that are not mechanistic can nonetheless count as 
explanatory if they correctly capture dependency relations that support  interventions.  
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